The Economic Basis of Attitudes towards the European Community: Familiarity Breeds Content? by Newton, Kenneth & Bosch, Augusti
IHS Political Science Series
Working Paper 12
April 1994
The Economic Basis of Attitudes 
towards the European Community: 
Familiarity Breeds Content?
Kenneth Newton
Augusti Bosch
Impressum
Author(s):
Kenneth Newton, Augusti Bosch
Title:
The Economic Basis of Attitudes towards the European Community: Familiarity Breeds 
Content?
ISSN: Unspecified 
1994 Institut für Höhere Studien - Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Josefstädter Straße 39, A-1080 Wien
E-Mail:  o ce@ihs.ac.atﬃ  
Web: ww   w .ihs.ac.  a  t 
All IHS Working Papers are available online: http://irihs.  ihs.  ac.at/view/ihs_series/   
This paper is available for download without charge at: http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/738/
1 Newton Attitudes towards the European Union 
Institut 
für 
Höhere Studien 
 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft  
 
12 April 1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Economic Basis of Attitudes 
towards the European Community: 
Familiarity Breeds Content? 
 
Kenneth Newton* / Augusti Bosch** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Professor of Political Science 
 Executive Director, European Consortium for Political Research 
 Department of Government, University of Essex, UK 
** Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona 
 
2 IHS Reihe Politikwissenschaft No. 12 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the economic basis of mass support 
for, and opposition to the European Community. In other words the main 
question is: to what extent, and in what ways, is popular support or 
opposition to the EC dependent upon economic circumstances and 
considerations? Behind this research question lies the matter of the 
legitimacy of the EC in the eyes of citizens across Europe.  
In some respects the results of this study are frustrating and inconclusive. 
In other respects, however, the results suggest some clear generalizations 
and conclusions. First, we have found rather little evidence that the EC or 
European unification are evaluated in primarily economic terms. Secondly, 
support seems to be associated more strongly with social and attitudinal 
variables of a non-economic kind. Thirdly, the figures suggest that diffuse 
and somewhat idealistic reasons for supporting unification and EC 
membership tend to outweigh more specific reasons. Fourthly, a solid 
foundation of inertia, custom, and national tradition seem to maintain 
support and make it grow.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1. Theory 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the economic basis of mass support 
for, and opposition to the European Community. In other words the main 
question is: to what extent, and in what ways, is popular support or 
opposition to the EC dependent upon economic circumstances and 
considerations? The paper will concentrate on »specific« evaluations of the 
European Community as a whole.  
Behind this research question lies the matter of the legitimacy of the 
EC in the eyes of citizens across Europe. Inglehart argues that »favourable 
economic payoffs are conducive to – perhaps even essential to – the 
processes of national and supranational integration«. (Inglehart 1978, 69, 
see also Reif and Inglehart 1991, 7). In much the same way integration 
theory, though it does not give an important part to public opinion, claims 
that economic rewards for the general population are of some significance in 
the drive towards integration. Nye, for example, points out that it is 
important that economic benefits are perceived to flow from integration 
(1971, 83 – 4).  
Some theorists argue that a widespread recognition of rewards is a 
necessary precondition of stronger and more enduring ties of loyalty (see, 
for example, Shepherd 1975, chap 6. and Hewstone 1986, 43). In the case 
of the EC it seems obvious that of the many kinds of reward, economic 
benefits are likely to be the most important. As Dalton and Eichenberg 
suggest, »at the base of any utilitarian model of public support for the 
European community must be considerations about its economic 
performance«. (1990, 3. See also Reif and Inglehart 1991, 7). To what 
extent does economic performance underpin utilitarian support for the EC, 
and is there any evidence to suggest that this sort of support preceded 
stronger ties of loyalty and legitimacy? 
It is equally obvious that economic benefits alone are not enough to 
establish the legitimacy of the EC. The stability of any political institution is 
uncertain if it depends wholely, or even largely, on a good economic 
climate. It is entirely appropriate that economic considerations and 
performance should enter into the calculus of consent, but like nation 
states, the Community cannot depend upon utilitarian support of an 
economic kind. It must build its future prospects to some extent on values 
that can both transcend and outlast calculations of economic gain and loss; 
it must have roots that are deep enough and strong enough to weather even 
severe economic drought.  
Some research studies have concluded that the EC lacks democratic 
legitimacy, that its foundations of »permissive consensus« are not deeply 
rooted (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970, Stavridis 1992), and that it depends 
too much upon instrumental calculations of personal and national interests. 
The EC, it is said, is caught in a vicious circle, as a weakly integrated 
system it finds difficulty in promoting European integration, and without 
support for integration it finds it difficult to promote policies which reinforce 
support (Caporaso 1973; Caporaso 1974; Handley 1981, 360;). Not 
suprisingly, research which finds the EC too heavily dependent on utilitarian 
and specific support (especially economic support) often finds that adverse 
economic circumstances tend to undermine its popularity (see, for 
example, Caporaso 1974; Handley 1981; Lindberg and Scheingold 1970; 
Shepherd, 1975; Jowell and Hoinville 1977). 
6 IHS Reihe Politikwissenschaft No. 12 
On the other hand, others have argued that the EC has built up 
support of a more enduring and diffuse or affective kind. They see signs of a 
growing European identity and trust, and of beliefs in the goals and ideals of 
European integration, especially among the younger generation. (Hewstone 
1986; Inglehart 1977; Inglehart 1990; Inglehart and Rabier 1978; Merritt and 
Puchala 1968). Questions about the nature and strength of EC support 
remain however.
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In Easton’s terminology, does the EC attract the diffuse and enduring 
support of Europeans, or is it rather more dependent on specific support of 
a more short-run kind? (Easton 1965, 249).  
The practical matter of the legitimacy of the EC is the first general 
concern of this paper. The second is a more theoretical interest in the 
extent to which economic circumstances and factors mould – even 
determine – our political world view. In the context of the EC this question 
turns on the matter of whether citizens evaluate the EC in terms of their 
material or in terms of their ideal interests? Economic interests are among 
the most important material matters; ideal interests include such things as 
world peace, European co-operation, social justice, and environmental 
protection. Studies of politics at the national level suggest that economic 
conditions and perceptions have a strong impact on support for 
governments and on electoral behaviour. At the same time, these economic 
influences are not necessarily of a selfish or »pocket-book« nature, but 
often socially aware and »sociotropic« (see, for example, Tufte 1978, 65; 
Lewis-Beck 1986; Lewin 1991; Rattinger 1991, 50). Is the same true of 
support for the EC? The fact that this study will be both cross-national (nine 
to twelve nations), and across-time (up to seventeen years) adds to its 
interest as a test case for the »economic voting« hypothesis at the level of 
international government.  
There is no hard and fast distinction to be drawn between economic 
and non-economic, or between the material and the ideal. Nor is there a 
simple dichotomy between »narrow materialism« and »high minded-
idealism«. More to the point, mass opinion about anything as large and 
complex as the European Community is highly likely to be based upon a 
mixture of different factors and dispositions, ranging from naked economic 
self-interest, through sociotropic calculations of an economic nature, to 
considerations of an idealistic kind. Moreover, the mix of different sorts of 
reasons for supporting or opposing the EC may well change over time in 
different countries according to different, social, political, and economic 
circumstances.  
1.2. Methods 
Economic conditions and circumstances may affect support for the 
European Community in three ways. First, they may be related to 
differences between countries at any given point in time. For example, it 
may be that the wealthier nations are inclined to show the highest levels of 
support because their citizens believe that the EC has helped to create the 
conditions of their economic success. The first stage of the analysis, 
therefore, compares levels of support in different nations at the same point 
in time – a cross-sectional analysis.  
Secondly, changing economic circumstances may affect levels of 
mass support for the EC in the same nation over a period of time. For 
example, support may grow in those countries whose economies are 
growing, or whose inflation or unemployment rates rates are low or falling. 
According to Dalton and Eichenberg, for example, »the improvement in 
national economies during the 1980s yielded a substantial measure of 
support for the Community« (Dalton and Eichenberg 1991, 13). The second 
part examines how changing economic circumstances in the same country 
influence support for the EC over a period of time – a time-series analysis. 
The first two approaches deal with aggregate data at the national level. 
The third type of analysis deals with individual citizens. It uses the 
Eurobarometer surveys to analyses EC support among individuals with 
different economic characteristics. For example, it may be that the 
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employed are more favourably disposed towards the EC than the 
unemployed, or that wealthier individuals are more favourable. The third 
section of the paper, therefore, deals with individuals. In this sense it 
complements the national or aggregate analysis of the first two sections. 
And a last preliminary point. The concentration upon economic 
variables in this paper does not suggest that these are the only ones worth 
considering, or that we have exhausted the topic of EC support if we deal 
with them systematically. It simply reflects a division of labour within the 
project Beliefs in Government, Vol. II. Other questions about support for the 
EC are discussed elsewhere (see Duchesne and Frognier, Janssen). 
1.3. The EC as an Economic Organization 
First, it is necessary to show that citizens of EC nations do indeed see it 
as an economic organization. If they believe it has little or nothing to do with 
economics, then to ask questions about its economic basis would be 
pointless. Does the public think of the EC as having an important economic 
role? Fortunately it is relatively simple to answer this question, and the 
answer is reasonably clear. 
The most direct attempt to answer the question is found in the June 
1987 Eurobarometer survey (Commission of the European Communities, 
Eurobarometer, No. 27, 1987, 19–33) which asked, »What things in your 
opinion bring the countries of the European Community together most?«. 
Most people (41 per cent) answered in terms of »the economy« or »world 
peace«. In other words, they mixed material and idealistic reasons in equal 
parts. These two responses tied for first place, some 13 per cent ahead of 
the third option.  
More circumstantial evidence is available in other Eurobarometer 
surveys. They show that most people in the EC believe that it does have a 
significant economic role and should play an even larger one. For example, 
the 1989 and 1990 surveys (Eurobarometer, No. 32, 1989, 62; No. 33, 1990, 
27) find that a majority (51 per cent in 1990, 57 per cent in 1989) of people 
in the EC believe that currency decisions should be decided by the EC, and 
a smaller percentage (40 per cent and 35 per cent) believed that these 
should be national decisions. Similarly, more believed that VAT rates 
should be decided jointly within the European Community (48 per cent in 
1990, 51 per cent in 1989) than believed they should be decided nationally 
(39 per cent and 36 per cent).  
It is not necessary to labour the point. The Eurobarometer surveys 
show over and over again that the public sees the EC both as an important 
economic organization, and as an equally important political and diplomatic 
organization concerned with such things as peace, co-operation, European 
integration, environmental protection, social justice and development, and 
equality (see, for example, Eurobarometer, No. 31, 1989, 20–21; 
Eurobarometer, No. 24, 1985, 79–80).  
Dalton and Eichenberg argue that »For the European Community 
economic policy is the raison d’etre the EC is above all an economic 
institution« (Dalton and Eichenberg, 1991, 3, 14). The evidence presented 
here does not support so strong a conclusion so far as mass opinion is 
concerned, the surveys show that the public does see it as having an 
important economic function, and an increasingly large majority want it to 
play an even greater economic role . At the same time, the EC is also seen 
as having a range of important non-economic goals of a more ideal nature 
(see also Inglehart and Rabier 1978, 97). 
There are national differences in this respect, some being more 
utilitarian or economic than others. We can gauge this from answers to the 
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open-ended question asked in 1987, »When you hear about the European 
Community what does that bring to your mind«? (Eurobarometer, 1987, 1–
7). When the results are coded into economic and political responses, it 
appears that some nations, notably Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and 
the UK have a preponderance of people who see the EC primarily in 
economic terms. People in some other countries are inclined to see it more 
as a political  organization – Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and The 
Netherlands (see Table 1). We will return to this continuum of economic–
political perceptions later in the paper. Meanwhile we can safely conclude 
that it is sensible to ask questions about the economic basis of support for 
the EC, while recognizing that citizens across Europe see it as having both 
political and economic functions.  
1.4. Indicators of Support 
Responses to four standard questions used to measure support for 
European integration and for the EC will be used in this paper. They will be 
referred to in shorthand as »unification«, »membership«, »benefit«, and 
»dissolution«. Of the four, the »unification« question is the broadest, the 
most general and, the one that comes closest to asking about diffuse 
attitudes. Towards the other end of the continuum, the »benefits« question 
comes closest to asking about specific support. Although the question is 
carefully worded and avoids mentioning any particular type of benefit, it 
seems likely that some will have economic benefits in mind when they 
respond to it. On the diffuse–specific continuum, the membership question 
fits somewhere in the middle. The fourth question dealing with »dissolution« 
can be set aside for the moment. It is hypothetical and, not suprisingly, a 
relatively large proportion (about 50 per cent or more) give an »indifferent« 
(don’t know) response, or no reply. 
The »unification« question produces easily the strongest support. Well 
over 70 per cent of EC citizens regularly endorse this aim, sometimes over 
80 per cent. On average, about 10–15 per cent fewer support their country’s 
membership of the EC. Even so, support for membership has claimed a 
clear majority across Western Europe over the long run. A lower percentage 
– but still a majority – claim benefits from their country’s membership of the 
EC. Since the question was first asked regularly in 1983 about 50–55 per 
cent have claimed that they have benefited. The conclusion seems to be 
that diffuse support is more widespread than specific support across Europe 
as a whole (see Beliefs in Government, chapter 3). 
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2. Macro-Economic Factors 
2.1. Cross-Sectional Variations between Countries 
Support for the EC in any given year varies quite substantially from one 
country to another. The differences between nations have persisted over a 
relatively long period of time. This section of the paper is concerned with 
these cross-sectional differences between nations.  
The first and most elementary point to make is that some of the 
difference between countries is to be explained very simply in terms of when 
they joined the EC (see Beliefs in Government, chapter 3). None the less, 
the pattern is not simple or uniform. For example, Italy has generally shown 
higher levels of support than Germany, while Denmark and the UK have 
usually shown levels of support lower than Ireland. Spain and Portugal show 
higher levels of support than some of the older members. In other words, 
there are still differences between nations which joined at the same time, 
and a certain amount of overlap between some nations which joined at 
different times. To what extent do these national variations relate, among 
other things, to the economic circumstances of different countries? 
The simplest proposition, and the one which comes closest to a 
calculation of naked economic self-interest, is that countries which receive 
more from EC funds than they pay into them will be more supportive. 
According to one analysis »the EC has a budget which derives revenue and 
distributes benefits in a manner entirely unrelated to levels of national 
wealth«. (Ardy 1988, 425). This fact may encourage those who benefit and 
those who pay to make economic calculations the basis of support or 
opposition. Moreover, the publicity surrounding the Common Agricultural 
Policy, by far the largest part of the EC budget, may also encourage such 
economic calculations.  
For example, support for the EC in the UK was relatively low during the 
period in which Mrs Thatcher was arguing about the British payment, which 
she claimed, with a great deal of national publicity, was far too high. 
Support rose substantially after a lower contribution was negotiated. Just 
before the new financial settlement as few as 25 per cent of the British 
claimed that EC membership was »a good thing«; a year later the figure 
rose to 37 per cent. None the less, this highly publicized incident seemed 
to disturb the long-term upward trend of support in the UK for only a short 
time.  
Unfortunately, it is impossible to get satisfactory figures for net country 
receipts from the EC over a period of years. This is because the annual 
contributions of member states to Community revenues are published, but 
the totals of their annual receipts are not (Office for Official Publications of 
the European Communities 1991). However, precise figures for the average 
of 1982, 1983, and 1984 have been painstakingly calculated and published 
(Ardy 1988). Although this provides us with only nine cases (Belgium and 
Luxembourg are grouped together), we can examine them to see if they fit 
any pattern.  
At this stage of the analysis support for the EC is measured in terms 
of responses to the »membership« question which has the longest run in 
the Eurobarometer survey. Table 3 shows levels of support for membership 
of the EC in 1984 by country, and the average net per capita payments to 
(negative), or receipts from (positive) EC funds over the 1982–84 period. The 
table displays no obvious pattern. For example, Denmark, which was a 
substantial net beneficiary of EC finances, shows the lowest level of support 
(31 per cent) compared with Germany (53 per cent), a substantial net 
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contributor to funds. The Irish combined by far the largest net receipts with 
a lower than average level of support (43 per cent). The five countries which 
were net contributors to EC funds (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, 
France, and the UK) had a 54 per cent level of support. For the five net 
receivers of EC funds (Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Denmark) 
support was 52 per cent. The two largest receivers (Ireland and Greece) 
combined had a level of support of 40.5 per cent. For the two largest 
contributors (Belgium/Luxembourg and Germany) the figure was 61 per 
cent. 
The figures clearly support Dalton and Eichenberg’s conclusion that 
»EC budget distributions have no impact on citizen support for European 
institutions« (1990, 15). In fact, Table 3 deepens the mystery. Why are 
almost six out of ten among the Irish low on support when the EC 
contributes so heavily to their national economy? The same might be asked 
of the Greeks and the Danes, although they benefit less heavily. On the 
other side of the coin, why should two-thirds of the French support the EC 
when, on average, they make a (relatively small) annual net per capita 
payment into EC funds of about 10 ECU? We will return to these questions 
shortly.  
Meanwhile, we can try another tack. Perhaps national variations in EC 
support can be explained in terms of more general macro-economic 
considerations, such as national wealth or economic growth. After all the 
EC budget is an arcane matter, but issues such as inflation, 
unemployment, and economic growth have an immediate impact on 
everyday life. One hypothesis is that the wealthier countries with stronger 
economies will be able to compete more effectively in a larger and more 
open economic market and will therefore show higher levels of support for 
the EC. Germany would be an obvious case in point. Equally, it may be that 
poorer countries think that they will gain most, in the long run, from the 
modernizing effects of the EC, and will show high levels of support 
accordingly. Spain, Greece, and Portugal might be examples. Perhaps both 
propositions are true, in which case plotting Gross National Product against 
EC support would produce a U-curve.  
Table 4 presents figures for Gross National Product per capita and 
support for the EC in 1975, 1980, and 1985. Once again, the small number 
of cases makes it impossible to draw any hard and fast conclusions. 
Nevertheless there is little evidence to suggest an association between 
national wealth and EC support. On the contrary, the figures suggest no 
kind of linear relationship, either positive or negative, or any other kind of U, 
S, or J-curve.  Luxembourg, Germany, and Denmark, were the three most 
affluent nations, but they had relatively high, intermediate, and low levels of 
support respectively. Conversely, Italy, Ireland, and Greece had relatively 
low GDPs, but whereas Italy had high support figures, Ireland and Greece 
had low ones. There seems to be a random relationship between GNP per 
capita and EC support.  
Perhaps, then, it is a dynamic matter related to economic growth – 
countries which are doing well, and expanding their economies and growing 
richer will feel well-disposed towards the EC, perhaps attributing some of 
their success to it? Or perhaps it is the other way round; rich countries may 
feel that they could do even better outside the EC, whereas the poorer ones 
feel they need to be inside the market? Once again, there is nothing in the 
figures to support either hypothesis (see Table 5). For example, Germany 
sustained a rather higher growth rate than Italy 1968–1985, but Italian 
support for the EC was regularly higher over the same period. In the 1979–
85 period, Luxemburg’s economy grew only marginally faster than 
Denmark’s, but whereas Luxembourg was strongly supportive, Denmark 
12 IHS Reihe Politikwissenschaft No. 12 
was not. Luxembourg’s population was generally favourable whether its 
economic growth was relatively good (1968–73 and 1979–85) or relatively 
poor (1973–9). Likewise, Ireland’s relatively good growth rate of 3 per cent in 
1973–9 was associated with relatively low support for the EC. In short, there 
is no systematic difference between fast and slow growth countries so far 
as support of the EC is concerned.  
We will not burden readers with any more figures showing no clear 
relationship between macro-economic indicators and levels of support for 
EC membership. It is enough to say that we tried to find patterns for 
unemployment, for exports and imports both within the EC and outside, for 
trade dependence, and for growth of exports and imports and trade 
dependence. Tables were scrutinized, figures rearranged in different ways, 
totals and sub-totals for different groups of nations aggregated and 
reaggregated, and scattergrams drawn up, but the figures were as randomly 
arranged as those in the tables presented.  
The search for economic determinants should not end here. So far we 
have considered the »membership« indicator of support, but we might 
expect economic factors and calculations to be reflected most clearly in 
response to the »benefits« question. Though it does not specifically 
mention economic benefits, it does ask respondents to think in terms of 
benefits, and economic benefits may come easily to mind. Perhaps the 
matter of payments into and receipts from the EC budget will be reflected in 
answers to the benefits question? 
At first sight, there is a suggestion in the figures that they do (see 
Table 3). In 1984 the five countries which were beneficiaries of EC funding 
claimed to have benefited more frequently (53 per cent) than the four which 
made net payments into the EC budget (44.5 per cent). The pattern is 
clearest at the extremes. Belgium/Luxembourg and Germany were the two 
largest net contributors, and only 49.5 per cent of their population claimed 
benefits. Ireland and Greece were the two largest beneficiaries, and 56 per 
cent of their populations claimed benefits. 
On closer examination budgetary considerations are evidently muted 
by other considerations. The five net beneficiaries were barely more likely to 
claim to have benefited (53 per cent) than the EC average (52 per cent). 
Both Greece and Denmark were substantial net receivers of funds, but fewer 
of their citizens claimed to have benefited than the EC average. In fact, 
fewer of the Danes claimed to have benefited than the Germans, the 
French, or the Belgians who were net payers. In financial terms the 
Netherlands and Italy were relatively worse off than Ireland, Greece and 
Denmark, but the Dutch and the Italians claimed greater benefit. The 
difficulty of interpreting the figures is also complicated by the fact that in the 
case of Belgium and Luxembourg, the benefits flowing from the location of 
the main bureaucracy must be added to the direct transfer of budget 
payments. 
A third look at the figures (Table 6) suggests that budgetary matters 
are mixed up with length of membership in the following way. Of the original 
six, the net receivers (The Netherlands and Italy) perceive greater benefit 
than the net payers (Belgium/Luxembourg, France, and Germany). And of 
the later members, the net receivers (Ireland, Greece, and Denmark), 
perceive greater benefit than the net payers (UK). The pattern is clearest at 
the extremes, those who joined early and are net receivers of funds are 
most likely to perceive benefits (Italy and The Netherlands) compared with 
those who joined late and are net payers (the UK). In the middle groups, 
however, the pattern is jumbled. It seems that even when they are asked to 
consider the benefits of EC membership, many people do not have the hard 
facts of the distribution of the EC budget in mind. 
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Attempts to match other economic variables to responses to the 
»benefits« question were largely unsuccessful, as Tables 4 and 5 show. As 
before, reasons of space prevent the presentation of many tables showing 
random associations. They may be summarized briefly, answers to the 
»benefit« question do not seem to be consistently or strongly related to any 
of the macro-economic variables which have been matched with the 
membership question – GNP per capita, growth of GNP, unemployment, 
exports and imports within and outside the EC, and trade dependency. For 
the most part the association was usually nonexistent. At best they were 
weak and marked by many exceptions.  
The economic variables used so far are all objective measures. Modern 
voting studies, however, suggest that subjective measures of voter 
perceptions are better indicators of support for parties and governments, 
especially measures of consumer confidence and well-being – the »feel-
good factor«. Is the same true of support for the EC? Perhaps the best 
starting point is Table 1 which shows countries on the »economic–political« 
continuum. In the light of what was said earlier about the newer and older 
members of the EC it is clear that the figures show that the most recent 
members of the EC tend to have a relatively strong economic image of the 
EC – Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and GB. Conversely, the older 
members tend to have a stronger political image, especially Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and The Netherlands. Moreover, there is a rough fit between 
economic images and lower levels of support, and political images and 
higher levels of support (See Table 7). The four countries with the strongest 
economic image had an average support level of 64 per cent in 1987; the 
four countries with the strongest political image had an average support 
level of 80 per cent. Unfortunately, Britain and Denmark spoil this neat 
pattern in a decisive way. 
These two major exceptions apart, however, there is evidence here to 
suggest that the more the population of a country treats the EC as an 
economic organization, the less supportive of the EC that population is 
likely to be. The generalization must be tentative at this stage. First, it is 
based on the individual level aggregated at the national level, and therefore 
more than a little suspicious.Secondly, it tells us nothing about causal 
relations. Do people in countries which have a political image of the EC 
support it because of its political benefits; or do people in countries which 
generally support the EC focus on its political aspects; or is there a third, 
common factor which underlies both support and political images? It seems 
best to leave these questions to the last section of the paper which deals 
with the individual level of analysis. 
    We cannot conclude from this first section that macro-economic 
conditions do not affect levels of support for the EC. First there are far too 
few countries to draw any firm conclusions. Secondly, we have found some 
evidence, albeit weak and secondary, of an association between the 
»benefits« question and net payments into or receipts from the EC 
budget.Thirdly, we have also found some evidence of an association 
between political images of the EC and support for it. However, with these 
two exceptions the analysis so far has come up with rather little to suggest 
that macro-economic variables are associated with popular support for, or 
opposition to, the EC. To this extent the results reinforce the conclusion 
that economic determinants of support are »weak and casual«. (Zeus 1990, 
45).  
There are, perhaps, three simple reasons for this conclusion. First, it 
is unlikely that many people in Europe know even the broad features of 
such things as net payments into or receipts from EC funds, or degree of 
trade dependency upon the EC. On the occasions that such things become 
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headline news (such as the controversy Thatcher created about the UK 
contribution to the EC budget), they may have an affect on EC support, but 
the impact seems generally to be fairly short lived. Secondly, the economic 
trends and circumstances that citizens are aware of, such as 
unemployment or inflation or GNP growth, are not seen as related to or 
caused by the EC. In Lewis-Beck’s term (1986, 108) there is little or no 
»attribution of responsibility« to the EC for economic conditions. A general 
mood of consumer confidence may rub off on to general feelings about 
government at the international level, but the association is likely to be 
distant and contingent. Thirdly, it may be that a substantial proportion of EC 
citizens weigh the ideal of European unification and co-operation more 
heavily than more instrumental considerations of an economic kind. The 
circumstantial evidence is that they do. 
2.2. Changes Within Countries Over Time 
Support for the EC has increased gently and unevenly, but consistently over 
the long run (see Table 2). Furthermore the overall trend is fairly similar in 
most member states, although the rise from comparatively low levels has 
been rather more steep in recent years in Spain, Greece, and Portugal. 
Most countries, however, impose their own set of short-term bumps and 
slumps in support from year to year, and most recently problems with the 
Maastricht agreement have been associated with a slump in support. To 
what extent is the overall upward trend or the year-to-year variations in 
particular countries the consequences of economic circumstances and 
change?  
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Inglehart and Rabier (1978, 74) conclude from a time-series analysis of the 
nine member states in the 1973 – 1977 period that »Public evaluations of 
membership in the Community seem linked with economic growth or 
decline«. Handley (1981, 360) agrees, stating that »Inflation, unemployment 
and stagnation [in the mid-1970s] were undoubtedly influencing public 
attitudes and government policy stands toward Europe, its institutions, and 
peoples«. Dalton and Eichenberg (1991, 13) find that »the improvement in 
national economies during the 1980s yielded a substantial measure of 
support for the Community«. 
This section of the paper will examine changes in support over time, 
using the »membership« question as the main indicator. This question is 
the longest running in the Eurobarometer survey and provides a time-series 
from 1973 to 1990. The »unification« question was also used because it 
provides a time-series from 1978–1990. The macro-economic variables 
related to these two questions are those already used in the previous 
section, namely unemployment, inflation, GNP, trade relations  (both 
exports and imports within and outside the EC as a percentage of GNP), 
and trade dependence.  
In addition, a set of non-economic control variables were used to test 
the strength of economic factors. These were drawn from the Eurobarometer 
surveys in the form of questions tapping »satisfaction or dissatisfaction with 
life on the whole«, »happiness or unhappiness with all things taken 
together«, »satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the way democracy works in 
your country«, and whether respondents thought next year would be 
»better, worse, or the same, as this year« (see the appendix to this paper 
for further details of the questions). Responses to these questions were 
aggregated for each nation, and for each year of the time-series. In addition, 
because the most cursory inspection of the graphs and previous research 
(Zeus 1990, 56–7) shows that support is strongly related to (1) length of 
membership of the EC, and (2) the simple passage of time, these two 
variables were also entered into the time-series regressions. 
Nine member states were analysed, the time-series for Spain, Greece, 
and Portugal being too short for reliable analysis. Each indicator of support 
was analysed in two ways. The first related absolute levels of support to 
absolute levels in the independent variables. The second related year-on-
year changes in both dependent and independent variables as a way of 
maximizing the variance from one year to the next. Each of these was run 
twice, the first for concurrent years, the second lagged the support measure 
by twelve months. A previous study suggested that twelve months would be 
the optimum time period (Inglehart and Rabier 1978, 72). 
The result of this work was eight regression equations for each of the 
nine countries. Rather than presenting this large volume of statistics, most 
of them inconclusive or insignificant or both, we will briefly summarize the 
results. 
1. Most of the variables are insigificant, and even when statistically 
significant they are substantively small – they explain 5 per cent or less of 
the variance.  
2. The pattern of significant variables varies from one country to the 
next and from one dependent variable to the next. Sometimes the same 
variable has a positive effect in one country, a negative one in another.  
3. Economic variables do not generally appear in the equations. So far 
as economic change has an impact at all, it seems to be a short-term one 
which is smoothed over by the long-term trend. Simple correlations suggest 
a moderately strong relationship between levels of economic confidence and 
EC support, but the regressions show that this is more likely to be 
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attributable to a more general »feel good« factor which includes economic, 
political and personal satisfaction with life and with future prospects. 
4. At first sight there seems to be a close correlation between 
attitudes towards the EC and various indicators of national trade within the 
Community. Countries with a high proportion of exports and imports within 
the EC show higher levels of support for it. On closer inspection, however, 
this turns out to be a spurious relationship. If we control for inflation the 
correlation is reduced to insignificance. Moreover, support for the EC 
continues to rise even in the countries, such as the UK, with an 
increasingly adverse balance of trade within the EC. 
5. Social and political rather than economic attitudes seem to be more 
influential, especially happiness, satisfaction with democracy, and optimism 
about next year. Even so, their effect is generally fairly weak when 
significant, and it is quite often not significant at all. Support for EC 
membership seems to be rather more closely related to these attitude 
variables than support for European unification, which, if anything, seems to 
be slightly less sensitive to changes in popular mood.  
6. One variable stands out as important – the passage of time. 
Support for EC membership and for European unification simply grows 
slowly in the long term. Each year seems to add, on average about a fifth to 
a quarter of 1 per cent to approval of European unification and EC 
membership. The rate of growth does not seem to vary much according 
year of joining the EC. However, the inclusion of Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal might change this conclusion. Their support increased dramatically 
just before membership and continued to rise relatively steeply after.  
It should be emphasized that a seventeen-year time-series is not a 
particularly reliable basis for statistical generalization. It is more satisfactory 
than a cross-sectional analysis of six, ten, or twelve nations, but the results 
are still tentative. Never the less, the results of the cross-sectional and 
time-series studies carried out here are consistent. Both are consistent with 
the conclusions of the Zeus study (Zeus, 1990). This pools data for different 
countries and different years so as to produce a larger number of 
observations, and concludes that socio-economic variables generally have a 
weak and variable impact on the four Eurobarometer indicators of support, 
while length of membership has a strong and consistent impact – »The 
longer a country belongs to the Community, the more its people appreciate 
it«. (Zeus 1990, 59).  
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3. Micro-Economic Factors 
3.1. Attitudes Among Member States of the EC 
It is possible that individuals with different economic characteristics may 
vary in their support for the EC, even though countries with different 
economic characteristics do not. For example, relatively wealthy individuals 
within nations may support the EC, even though wealthy countries may not 
do so. The difference between aggregate figures and individual-level data is, 
of course, the basis of the psychological and ecological fallacies, and we 
must be careful not to fall for either. In this section we will stick to individual-
level explanations. A plausible example might be that wealthier people may 
approve of the EC because they believe that it promotes the business which 
is the basis of their affluence. As always, this proposition may also be 
reversed; perhaps the poorer sections of a population support the EC on the 
grounds that it will help them improve their economic circumstances, 
whereas the rich tend to be opposed to it because of its attempts to 
redistribute resources.  
In dealing with the individual-level explanations we are on strong 
statistical ground because the EC itself has conducted its Eurobarometer 
surveys in each EC member state at least once a year since 1973. Even 
so, the common core questions asked in each country and in each year do 
not include the full range of economic data required for the present analysis. 
Therefore, it must rely upon questions which have been asked at irregular 
intervals since 1973. Since there are still gaps in the data it is necessary to 
analyse slightly different sets of variables, and slightly different sets of years 
for different countries. None the less, it is possible to use the 
Eurobarometer surveys to achieve a reasonable degree of comparability 
across different nations and across time.  
The individual economic data are of two types. The first deal with the 
objective economic characteristics of respondents, social class, family 
income, and employed/unemployed status. In addition, it is possible to 
identify farmers and fishermen. They are of particular and special interest 
because they benefit directly from the EC’s largest single item of 
expenditure, the Common Agricultural Policy.  
The second type deals with subjective economic expectations and 
attitudes, including, whether respondents expect more or fewer strikes in 
the next year (a measure of economic optimism); whether governments 
should play a greater role in reducing income inequality; whether 
government should intervene more in economic affairs; and whether 
governments should expand public ownership. Altogether, therefore, the 
Eurobarometer surveys have data about four objective and four subjective 
economic variables.  
These are contrasted with a set of seven non-economic control  
variables which are included in many, but not all, Eurobarometer surveys. 
There are three objective ones – age, gender, and the age at which the 
respondent left school – and four subjective ones – overall life satisfaction, 
satisfaction with society, optimism or pessimism about next year, and left–
right party support. A final variables straddles the economic and the non-
economic. It groups people according to their materialism and 
postmaterialism scores (Inglehart 1977, 1990). Further details of these 
variables are contained in the appendix to this paper. 
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3.2. Membership of the EC 
As before, the first indicator of support for the EC will be the »membership« 
question. And as before, the analysis will be done on a country-by-country 
basis. Pooling the survey data for the whole of the EC is possible, but the 
persistent differences between countries means that this is likely to confuse 
rather than clarify. As a first step we examined the simple correlations 
between economic and non-economic variables and support for the EC in 
each member state. The figures are not presented here partly because the 
tables are far too bulky, and partly because they are only preliminary to the 
regression analysis. The results can be summarized in a few sentences.  
1. The table contains 486 cells related to the eight economic variables. 
Of these, 195 (40 per cent) contain significant correlations. The table 
contains 669 cells relating to non-economic variables, and of these 375 (56 
per cent) are significant. 
2. The figures that are statistically significant are generally rather low 
and of no great substantive significance. The sample size of a thousand in 
most countries (except Luxembourg) means that quite small correlations 
can be statistically significant. Few rise much above 0.20, and most are 
generally lower. This is generally true of non-economic and economic 
variables alike. 
3. The same economic variable was significant in some countries (e.g. 
class in Denmark, UK, Ireland, and France) but not others (Italy, Belgium, 
The Netherlands, and Luxembourg).  
4. The direction of the association sometimes varies from year to year, 
and country to country. 
5. On the other hand, some of the non-economic control variables are 
more consistently related to support for the EC, most notably satisfaction 
with life, education, and the left–right variable. (On the importance of the 
left–right variable and of party cues, see Hewstone 1991, 99; Worre 1988).  
However, these statements are based on simple correlations. Could it 
be that the real effects of economic circumstances are only revealed after 
making allowances for social and political variables? To answer this 
question, multivariate regression analysis is undertaken as shown in Table 
8. This table does not show regression coefficients for the non-economic 
control variables, because these are discussed in greater depth and detail 
in other papers in this volume. It should be remembered, however, that the 
multivariate results reported in Table 8 include the non-economic control 
variables of life satisfaction, happiness, satisfaction with democracy, 
expectations for next year, age, education, left–right party, and gender.  
The regression results do not reveal powerful or widespread economic 
effects. On the contrary, economic variables do not make much contribution 
to the regression equations. Those that are statistically significant generally 
make a scattered, weak, and fairly random appearance in different countries 
and years. The only economic variable to make much of a showing is the 
occupational category for farmers and fishermen. 
Nor are the non-economic variables particularly strong either, but a few 
of them, including education, gender, and life satisfaction, are persistently 
more significant than any of the economic measures. In particular, the 
general measure of optimism or pessimism about next year (answers to the 
question, »Do you think next year will be better, the same, or worse than 
this«?) emerges as significant in most countries in at least some years. 
The left–right political dimension is important in Denmark, the UK, and 
France, and sometimes in other countries. Life satisfaction and 
optimism/pessimism about next year also made modest contributions, as 
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they did to the time-series analysis reported earlier. This suggests a degree 
of consistency with the time-series section of this study. 
The time-series analysis suggested that the simple passage of time is 
associated with growing support for unification and the EC. This may be 
explained in two ways, or a combination of them both. First, support for the 
EC may grow as the population as a whole becomes accustomed to it. 
Secondly, support may grow as the older population is replaced by younger 
age cohorts who are more favourable. In the latter case we would expect to 
find age appearing as a significant variable in the regression results reported 
in Table 6. With the exception of Denmark, however, age is not generally 
significant. It would seem, therefore, that support is growing in the 
population as a whole, and not especially in the younger age groups. 
Overall the results of the regression equations are not particularly 
encouraging in the sense that economic and non-economic variables taken 
together do not explain a substantial proportion of the variance – generally 
less than 30 per cent and often less than 10–15 per cent. Non-economic 
variables are generally more significant than economic ones, but neither are 
powerful. 
3.3. Support for European Unification 
The same set of regressions as those reported in Table 8 were run using 
support for European unification as the dependent variable. The »unification« 
question was not asked regularly in the Eurobarometer survey until the 
autumn of 1978, so we do not have the same number of years for analysis. 
Nevetheless, taking into account holes in the available data in some 
countries or in some years, it is possible to run seperate regressions for 
each member state in 1979, 1984, and 1990. 
The results were even worse, if anything, than those already presented 
in Table 8, so that once again they can be briefly summarized in a few 
sentences. Of the 142 cells for economic variables, eleven beta coefficients 
were statistically significant (8 per cent). Of the 138 cells for non-economic 
variables, seventeen were statistically significant (12 per cent). This means 
that neither economic nor non-economic variables are closely associated 
with support for European unification, although the non-economic variables 
are marginally better. No single variable stands out as worthy of note even 
in this array of poor results. The result is a thin and patchy distribution of 
weak coefficients which have different effects in different countries and in 
different years. In sum, we have what might be called a Jackson Pollack, no 
discernible pattern.  
3.4. Farmers and Fishermen 
We will finish the paper with two brief test-cases which put the economic 
hypothesis to the acid test. The first involves the farmers and fishermen of 
the EC. The Common Agricultural Policy is the largest single item in the EC 
budget. Irrespective of payments and receipts from EC funds in any given 
country, farmers and fishermen in all countries benefit directly from EC 
payments and subsidies from the CAP. Some benefit very substantially. If 
any social or occupational group has an incentive to support the EC on 
grounds of personal financial interest, it is the farmers and fishermen in the 
member states. At the same time it is not difficult to imagine why some 
farmers and fishermen might be strongly opposed to the EC. Perhaps 
farmers associate the painful restructuring of the agricultural sector over the 
past two or three decades with the EC. In sum, it may be that farmers and 
fishermen will support the EC because it provides them with a high 
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proportion of their income, but it is also possible that they will oppose it 
strongly in spite of CAP payments and subsidies. Either way it is to be 
expected that farmers and fishermen will have a stronger feeling about the 
EC one way or another than their compatriots. 
Do farmers and fishermen support or oppose EC membership more 
often than other employed citizens in their own country? Table 9 presents 
the summary results of a statistical test of this proposition in EC countries 
over a set of seven years. It should be noted that in spite of the total sample 
sizes in each country (except Luxembourg) the numbers of farmers and 
fishermen in the survey is often low in some countries. As a result, quite 
large percentage differences are sometimes not statistically significant.  
The table presents the familiar picture of a fairly thin scattering of 
rather variable results. Of the sixty-nine possibilities only twenty-two (32 per 
cent) are statistically significant. In other words, farmers and fishermen are 
not generally significantly different from the other employed people in their 
own country. The exceptions are Ireland and Denmark, and to some extent 
Germany. 
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In most other countries and in most of the years farmers and fishermen 
have much the same sorts of attitudes as anyone else. In Italy, they reflect 
the national pattern in all the seven years analysed.  
Table 9 also gives the direction of the significant differences, a plus 
sign showing support that is stronger than other employed people in the 
country, and a negative sign showing less support. In Denmark and Ireland, 
the sign is always positive, but in Germany it is more usually negative. As 
in other parts of the analysis, this shows that the same set of economic 
circumstances can have entirely different effects in different countries, or in 
different years. 
In fact in 1990 all the significant figures (France, Belgium, Germany, 
and Luxembourg) were negative, and there were no positive ones, even 
among the usually supportive Danes and Irish. This contrasts with the four 
out of five positive signs in 1974. There are some indications that farming 
communities have turned against the Common Market and the Maastricht 
agreement (notable in the recent French referendum), and it is possible that 
the general mood has switched across Europe. For the moment, however, it 
seems safer to conclude that the relationship is variable, that recent 
opposition is due to problems with GATT and farming support, and that the 
pattern may well reverse in future years when and if these problems are 
sorted out.  
The overall distribution of figures in Table 9 is consistent with those in 
previous tables in this paper. First, there is little indication that economic 
considerations play a strong role in the evaluation of the EC, even among 
the occupational group which benefits most from its budget. Farmers and 
fishermen are much the same as everybody else. Secondly, the relatively 
small number of significant figures form no obvious pattern so far as most 
countries and most years are concerned. The exceptions are Denmark, 
Ireland, and Germany. But in France, where the CAP is a highly politicized 
matter, the figure is significant in only two out of seven years. Thirdly, the 
direction of the effect differs from one country to another, being positive in 
some countries, negative in others. 
3.5. Spain and Portugal 
The second limiting test of the economic hypothesis centres on Spain and 
Portugal. In laying out the foundations for this study Section 2 showed that 
citizens in some member states see the EC more as an economic than a 
political organization. Later it was shown that the most economic images of 
the EC are to be found mainly in the newer member states, notably Greece, 
Spain, and Portugal. Moreover, it was also shown (generally but not 
invariably) that the nations which see the EC more in economic than 
political terms tend to have lower levels of support for it. However, it was 
suggested that there are different interpretations of this three-cornered 
relationship. 
We can now investigate this set of associations in greater depth, 
focusing on Spain and Portugal because they they are among the most 
»economic« nations (Table 1) and because the Eurobarometer surveys 
asked some interesting questions in these two countries just before they 
joined. First, the surveys asked in the autumn of 1985 what future economic 
benefits were expected of the EC. Generally speaking those who expected 
economic benefits also supported membership in both Spain and Portugal 
(gamma = 0.70, 0.87 respectively).  
Before concluding that prospective economic judgements are related 
to EC support, however, a set of other questions about benefits should be 
considered. The surveys also asked about political benefits for democracy, 
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and about benefits for the roles of Spain and Portugal in the world. Not 
suprisingly, the responses to the three questions about economic, political, 
and diplomatic benefits are closely associated (gamma = 0.80, 0.73, 0.91 
for Spain; 0.87, 0.84, and 0.87 for Portugal). Moreover, there is also a close 
association between expectations for all three benefits and support for EC 
membership (gamma = 0.70, 0.54, and 0.61 for Spain; and 0.87, 0.78, and 
0.83 for Portugal). In short, those who expected their country to benefit 
economically also expected it to benefit politically and diplomatically, and 
these people, in turn, supported EC membership. In other words, economic 
expectations appear to play an important role, but not necessarily more 
important than political and social factors. Moreover, we cannot even 
assume causal primacy for the economic variable. On the contrary, the 
survey results seem to suggest a generally favourable disposition towards 
the EC, from which flow a set of economic, political, and diplomatic 
expectations, and support for membership. This serves to qualify the 
conclusion reached earlier in the paper. (For a more detailed discussion of 
the Spanish and Portugese cases see Bosch 1992 and Bosch 1993). 
As before we might offer some tentative suggestions about why 
economic variables have rather little impact on attitudes of the general 
population towards either European unification or EC membership. First, the 
EC is fairly remote from the everyday experience of ordinary citizens. As a 
result, the sorts of economic circumstances and attitudes which typically 
have an impact on national voting and political attitudes may have a looser 
association with attitudes towards Europe and the EC. Citizens are more 
likely to praise or blame national government than the EC for economic 
gains or losses. 
Secondly, the strong support for European unification as a general 
goal suggests that individuals generally see the EC rather more in terms of 
ideal than material interests. Of course, it might be argued that the very 
remoteness of the EC is precisely why the harsh facts of economic reality 
do not intrude much upon popular support for it. Hence, even the 
unemployed, the poor, and the working class do not evaluate the EC in a 
significantly different way from the employed, the rich, and the upper class.  
Following this line of argument, it might be suggested that people do 
not so much choose to support the EC for diffuse or ideal reasons, but 
rather fail to make the connection between the EC and their own life 
experiences. The physical and political distance from Brussels, the 
democratic deficit, and the fact that national governments may intervene 
between the citizen and economic circumstances all help to protect the EC 
from economic accountability and judgement. Hence, circumstances may 
conspire to protect the average European’s rosy and idealistic view of 
European unification and the EC. Is this another case where distance 
makes the heart grow fonder? 
The evidence about farmers and fishermen rather argues against this 
interpretation. The EC is not at all remote for them. On the contrary, its 
effects are personal, powerful, immediate, and of very great economic 
importance. One would have thought that farmers and fishermen, of all 
people, would take a stand one way or the other on EC membership. They 
do not. In most countries and in most years they are not different from their 
otherwise employed compatriots. And where they are different, the stand 
they take is not necessarily supportive, in spite of the funds they receive 
directly from the CAP. Whatever else may be the case, their attitudes 
towards the EC can scarcely be explained in terms of its remoteness. 
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4. Conclusion 
In some respects the results of this study are frustrating and inconclusive. 
So far as economic considerations or variables do appear be associated 
with attitudes of support or opposition to the EC and European unification, 
they seem to have different effects in different countries and in different 
years. This makes it difficult to draw out any general conclusions.  
In other respects, the results suggest some clear generalizations and 
conclusions. First, we have found rather little evidence that the EC or 
European unification are evaluated in primarily economic terms. Never the 
less, the fact that we have been unable to find the evidence even after 
exhaustive analysis does not prove that it does not exist. At the same time, 
the results of this study are consistent with the systematic and wide-
ranging study produced by Zeus (1990), which shows a weak, variable, and 
patchy association between a wide range of economic variables and the four 
indicators of support. Those who find evidence of an economic impact (cf. 
Inglehart and Rabier 1978; Handley 1981; Dalton and Eichenberg 1991) 
seem to be generalizing about rather short-term effects, which, though 
significant at the time, tend to be smoothed out by long term-trends.  
Secondly, support seems to be associated more strongly with social 
and attitudinal variables of a non-economic kind. In regression analysis at 
the individual level it seems that optimism/pessimism about next year, left–
right orientation, education, and satisfaction with life in general are more 
closely associated with support than such things as income, class, or 
unemployment. In this sense the results of the individual surveys, based 
upon a large number of observations, are generally consistent with the 
conclusions of national-level analysis, which is necessarily limited to a 
small number of countries or a fairly short time-series. Given the differences 
between aggregate national data and individual survey data, there is no 
necessary theoretical reason why the results of the different levels of 
analysis should be the same. Nevethertheless, the fact that they support 
each other lends strength to the conclusion that support for the EC is not 
generally or powerfully determined by economic considerations. 
Thirdly, the figures suggest that diffuse and somewhat idealistic 
reasons for supporting unification and EC membership tend to outweigh 
more specific reasons. Not only is there rather little evidence of economic 
calculation as the basis of support, but there is clear evidence that the 
general goal of unification is supported more strongly than EC membership. 
Membership, in turn, has more supporters than those who see benefits in 
EC membership. The conclusion seems to be that support for membership, 
and even more for unification is at a high level, even among some of those 
who see few benefits. 
Fourthly, a solid foundation of inertia, custom, and national tradition 
seem to maintain support and make it grow. This is apparently true in two 
rather different ways, the countries which joined the EC first still maintain 
the highest levels of support; and support tends to increase slowly and 
unsteadily over the long term. In spite of short-term disturbances, some of 
them associated with economic circumstances, the long-term trend is for 
support to increase, suggesting that the people of the EC like it more as 
they grow accustomed to it. There is no evidence that support grows 
because an older and less favourable age group is replaced by a younger 
and better disposed one. It seems that the population as a whole is growing 
slowly but steadily more supportive. Familiarity breeds content. 
We might end with an even more speculative set of comments. First, 
we have found little evidence that specific calculations of an economic 
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nature have gradually been replaced by or converted into stronger and 
deeper ties of loyalty, as some theorists of integration and institution 
building have suggested (Shepherd 1975; Hewstone 1986, 43). Rather the 
EC seems to have accumulated both material and ideal support over the 
years, at least since the Eurobarometer surveys started. 
Secondly, we have found rather little evidence that support for the EC is 
elite lead or manipulated. If it were, we would expect parties to play a 
significant role as cueing agencies for mass attitudes. However, this study 
finds only a weak relationship between left–right orientations and support for 
EC membership in most member nations, except for Denmark and the UK, 
and to a lesser extent France. 
Thirdly, so far as the study suggests a role for economics at all, it 
indicates sociotropic rather than pocket-book calculations. Variables such 
as household income and employment/unemployment are weakly related to 
EC support; variables such as anticipated national benefits of an economic, 
political, and diplomatic kind are more strongly associated. 
However, behind the conclusions of this study there lurks a general 
problem which we cannot tackle here, and which is scarcely touched upon 
by the Eurobarometer surveys. It concerns the possibility that support for 
the EC, though widespread, is also rather flimsy and without great 
conviction. The EC is not a particularly salient issue for most people most 
of the time, and therefore favourable attitudes might easily be eroded or 
even reversed. The not infrequently high level of »Don’t know« or non-
committal responses to the four questions tapping support for European 
unification and the EC suggest that this may be the case. On the other 
hand, the evidence also suggests rather slow, long-term changes in 
support, punctuated by more extreme but generally short-lived fluctuations. 
This long-term stability combined with glacial changes suggests that EC 
support has fairly substantial foundations. 
The EC has recently suffered major set backs with the Maastricht 
Treaty and the European Monetary System. However, if we can generalize 
from the past – always a beguiling but dangerous activity – the effects on 
popular support for the EC, though considerable in the short run, are likely 
to wear off. The trends for support are likely to pick up and continue much 
as they were for most of the 1973–1990 period. 
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Appendix 
Full information about the data and the variables for the individual level 
analysis in this paper is presented in the codebook of the Cumulative Euro-
Barometer, 1973–1991, created by Dr Richard Topf, Department of Politics 
and Government, Guildhall University, London for the Beliefs in Government 
project of the ESF. The codebook is available from the Zentralarchiv für 
Empirische Sozialforschung, University of Cologne.  
The Eurobarometer data and variables are based upon the following 
questions and codings: 
Strikes : »Looking ahead to next year, do you think that strikes and 
industrial disputes (in this country) will increase, decrease, remain the 
same«? The options are coded 3, 2, 1 respectively.  
Income Inequality: »Do you agree or disagree that greater effort should be 
made to reduce inequality of income«? Strongly agree, agree, neither agree 
nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly are coded 5–1 respectively.  
Public ownership: »Do you agree or disagree that public ownership of 
private industry should be expanded«? Agree strongly, agree, neither agree 
nor disagree, disagree. disagree strongly are coded 5–1 respectively.  
Government management: »Do you agree or disagree that government 
should play a greater or sdmaller role (intervene less) in the management of 
the economy«?. Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, 
disagree, disagree strongly are coded 5–1 respectively. 
Class: Respondents are classified according to occupation into five groups 
– professionals, business owners, executives and managers, white collar, 
and manual workers.  
Employed: The employed are coded 1, the unemployed 0. 
Income: Gross family income is computed in quartiles of family incomes of 
each nation.  
Materialist-postmaterialist: The standard Inglehart variable is used, coding 
postmaterialists 3, materialists 1, and mixed 2.  
Dissatisfaction with life: »On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead«? 
These are coded 1–4 respectively. 
Unhappiness: »Taking all things together, how would you say things are 
these days - would you say you are very happy, fairly happy, nor not too 
happy these days«? Coded 1–3 respectively. 
Dissatisfaction with democracy: »On the whole are you very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy 
works in your country«? Coded 4–1 respectively.  
A worse future: »So far as you are concerned, do you think next year will be 
better or worse than this year«? Worse, same, better coded 3–1 
respectively. 
Age: Age in years. 
Education: Coded 1–9 according to the year the respondent left school 
between »up to 14« and »22 or over«.  
Left–right: The Cumulative Eurobarometer file codes party preference 
according to whether the respondent supports a rightist, centrist, or leftist 
party, coded 1–3 respectively. 
Gender: Males and females coded 1 and 2 respectively. 
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Table 1: Economic-Political Images of the European Community, 1987 
Belgium –3 
Denmark 11 
Finland 10 
Germany 14 
Great Britain 17 
Greece 39 
Ireland 24 
Italy –1 
Luxembourg –11 
NL –13 
Portugal 24 
Spain 20 
Source: Eurobarometer, No. 27, June 1987 
Note: The figures are the percentage of respondents in each country 
presenting a primarily economic image of the EC minus the percentage 
presenting a primarily economic one. A positive figure shows an economic 
image, a negative one a political one. 
Table 2: Indicators of Support by Length of EC Membership 
 1970 1975 1980 1983 1985 1986 1989 
Unification1 
EC6 74 74 76  81  82 
EC10 – 69 72  77  78 
EC12 – – –  74  78 
Membership2 
EC6 – 67 64  69  69 
EC10 – 59 53  60  65 
EC12 – – –  60  63 
Benefit3 
EC10    52  55 59 
EC12    –  46 59 
1 percentage supporting ‘very much’/‘to some extent’ 
2 percentage who regard it as a ‘good thing’ 
3 percentage claiming to have ‘benefited’ 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, Eurobarometer: Public 
Opinion; in the European Community, No. 32, December 1989, Vol. II, 
Trend; Variables: 41–78
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Table 3: Net Payments/Receipts and Support for the EC 
Country % reporting 
membership a 
‘good thing’ – 
1984 
% claiming  
to have bene-
fited – 1984 
Net per capita 
payments from 
EC funds* 
Belgium/Luxembour
g 
69 53 –47.07 
Denmark 31 44 +57.83 
EC(10) 55 52  
France 62 47 –9.98 
Germany 53 46 –45.02 
Greece 38 51 +80.00 
Ireland 43 61 +205.61 
Italy 70 63 +17.28 
NL 80 64 +17.11 
UK 32 32 –19.61 
* Receipts minus payments in ECU, averaged over 1982, 1983 and 1984 
Source: Hardy 1988; Eurobarometer, No. 32, 57–72 
Table 4: GDP Per Capita and Support for the EC 
Country % saying 
membership a 
‘good thing’ 
% claiming to 
have benefited 
GDP per capita 
($‘000)* 
 1975 1980 1985  1975 1980 1985 
Belgium 57 54 64 52 10.4 12.0 12.4 
Denmark 36 33 35 44 11.6 12.9 14.6 
France 64 51 68 50 10.7 12.3 13.0 
Germany 56 65 54 45 11.2 13.2 14.2 
Ireland 50 52 53 62 4.9 5.7 6.0 
Italy 71 74 72 65 6.8 8.1 8.7 
Luxembourg 65 84 84 73 11.3 12.5 14.3 
NL 64 75 77 63 10.9 12.0 12.3 
UK 47 21 32 31 8.8 9.5 10.3 
* GDP is real GDP per capita in constant prices expressed in thousand 
dollars at 1980 exchange rate. 
Source: Eurobarometer, No. 32, 57–72; Lane, McKay and Newton 1991, 49 
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Table 5: Economic Growth and Support for the EC 
Country % saying 
membership a 
‘good thing’ 
% 
claiming 
to have 
benefited 
GDP per capita ($‘000)* 
 1973 1979 1985  1968–73 1973–9 1979–85 
Belgium 57 65 64 52 10.4 12.0 12.4 
Denmark 42 37 29 44 11.6 12.9 14.6 
France 61 56 68 50 10.7 12.3 13.0 
Germany 63 66 54 45 11.2 13.2 14.2 
Ireland 56 54 53 62 4.9 5.7 6.0 
Italy 69 78 72 65 6.8 8.1 8.7 
Luxembour
g 
67 83 84 73 11.3 12.5 14.3 
NL 63 84 77 63 10.9 12.0 12.3 
Portugal – 24 28 – – 1.5 1.1 
Spain – 58 62 – – 1.4 1.4 
UK 31 33 32 31 8.8 9.5 10.3 
Source: Eurobarometer, No. 32, 1989, 57–72; Lane, McKay,  
and Newton 1991, 60 
Table 6: Benefits of EC Membership by Length of Membership and Net 
Payments or Receipts 
 Net receipts (+) or 
payments (–) in 
1982, 4 (ECU) 
% claiming to have 
benefited in 1984 
Early Members   
Belgium/Luxembour
g 
–47.07 53.0 
France –9.98 48.5 
Germany –45.02 42.5 
Italy +17.25 60.5 
NL +17.11 65.5 
Later Members   
Denmark +57.83 43.0 
Greece +80.00 48.0 
Ireland +205.61 60.0 
UK –19.61 32.0 
Source: Compiled from Table 2 
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Table 7: Economic or Political Images and Support for the EC, 1987 
 Economic 
images 
% believing membership 
a ‘good thing’ – 1987 
Belgium –3 70 
Denmark 11 39 
France 10 74 
Germany 14 62 
Greece 39 58 
Ireland 24 64 
Italy –1 79 
Luxembourg –11 87 
NL –13 83 
Portugal 24 68 
Spain 20 64 
UK 17 46 
Source: Table 1 and Eurobarometer, No. 27: 1–7
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Table 8: Economic and Non-Economic Variables and Support for 
Membership of the EC Significant regression (beta) coefficients for 
available years
Country Year Strike
s 
Equal Pub 
Own 
Gov. 
Man 
Class Empl Farm 
Fish 
Inc. Post 
Mat 
France 1973 – – – –  –    
 1976 –    .16 –    
 1979 –        – 
 1981          
 1984 –  –       
 1986  – – –   –14   
 1990 – – – –      
Belgium 1973 – – – –      
 1976 – – – –  –  .13  
 1979 –     –.23 –.20  – 
 1981  –.17        
 1984 –  –       
 1986  – – –      
 1990 – – – –   –.15 –.23  
Netherlands 1973 – – – –   –.34   
 1976 – – – –  –    
 1979 –   .17     – 
 1981          
 1984 –  –       
 1086  – – –      
 1990 – – – –      
Germany 1973 – – – –     .11 
 1976 – – – –   –   
 1979 –  –.13   –   – 
 1981  .15        
 1984 – –.14 – .15 .25   –.15  
 1986  – – –   –.13   
 1990 – – – –   –.12   
Italy 1973 – – – –      
 1976 – – – –  –    
 1979 –  –.23      – 
 1981          
 1984 –  –       
 1986  – – –  .19   -.16 
 1990 – – – –      
Luxembourg 1973 – – – –      
 1976 – – – –  –    
 1979 –     .40   – 
 1981      –    
 1986  – – –      
Denmark 1973 – – – – .12  .20   
 1976 – – – –  – .13 .13  
 1979 –  –.16      – 
 1986  – – –      
 1990 – – – –      
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Country Year Strike
s 
Equa
l 
Pub 
Own 
Gov. 
Man 
Class Empl Farm 
Fish 
Inc. Post 
Mat 
Eire 1973 – – – –   .11   
 1976 – – – – .23 – .29   
 1979 –        – 
 1981      –.25    
 1986  – – –      
UK 1973 – – – –      
 1976 – – – –  –    
 1979 – –.12       – 
 1981       –   
 1984 –  –    –   
 1986  – – – .18 .16    
Greece 1981   –.16       
 1986  – – –      
 1990 – – – –      
Spain 1986  – – –      
 1990 – – – –      
Portugal 1986  – – – .21 –.22   –.18 
 1990 – – – – .26     
Note: (a) Italicized numbers are significant at 0.01; all others at 0.05. (b) 
Some variables are not available in all years. A line has been drawn through 
cells where the data is missing. Empty cells indicate insignificant beta 
coefficients. 
Table 9: Support for EC Membersphip: Comparison of Farmers and 
Fishermen and other Employed Citizens in EC Member States
Country 1974 1976 1979 1981 1984 1986 1990 
Belgium       (–) 
Denmark (+) (+) (+) (+)  (+)  
Eire  (+) (+) (+) (+)  – 
France    (–)   (–) 
Germany (+) (–)    (–) (–) 
Greece – – – (+) (+)   
Italy        
Luxembour
g 
(+)      (–) 
NL (–)       
Portugal – – – – –   
Spain – – – – –   
UK (+)      – 
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Note: Italicized signs (Chi-square statistic) are significant at 0.01 
all others at 0.05; a line has been drawn through cells where the data  
is missing or not applicable. 
 
 
